0730

No enemy activity during the nite. F Co reports a booby trap set off. finding enemy rifle, pistol and bloody stains. The Japs are still carrying away their dead & wounded. They are burying their dead in large caves. D Co unearthed two such caves yesterday. We suffered 2 WIAs yesterday, one being Lt Mathers of F Co. There have been no messages the past few days as Capt Taylor has been up at the front directing operations verbally.

1000

F Co assaulted high ground to their front encountering enemy sniper fire. 4.2 mortars laid barrage prior to assault.

1300

E co has secured ridge to their front receiving MG & sniper fire. 1330 C Co. 1st Bn moved up in left flank of F Coo.

1600

Our casualties are heavy today. Hq Co M Gunners catching it again. Most of the casualties being GSWs. "I" co 3d Bn now on D Co right flank. Bulldozers are really doing a job in the operation, filling tank traps and widening the road to bring up supplies.

1800

There is a shortage of mortar ammo of all types. Units have been cautioned to uz.e it sparingly.

at 0545 enemy again attempted to infiltrate but was driven off by automatic weapons fire. One enemy confirmed killed. At 0900 "E" and "F" Cos. moved NE along D co. front. At 1400 the company less the 3rd platoon moved to ridge approximately 400 yds. to the direct front without opposition. At 1630 the 3rd platoon under Lt. Watkins joined the Co. and then moved to the next ridge for reconnaissance. Upon reaching reaching the top of the ridge the platoon came upon a enemy HMG and several supporting pillboxes. The platoon killed two enemy and then withdrew under heavy automatic fire. Pvt. Pitchford was killed and Pvt. Ozarzah wounded by enemy sniper fire, both machine gunners from Hq. Co. Qt 1745 Lt. Beaty in command of attached machine guns was wounded by sniper fire. During the night several attempted infiltrations were repulsed. No casualties.

The company with ate LMG's moved out at 1030 hr. with the mission of seizing and securing hill 500 yd's to the front. By 1400 hr. objective taken and the men were in position and dug in. 1 KIA & 2 WIA fr LMG's. 1 KIA & 4 WA fr Co.

I spent the early part of the morning with the M-7 commanded by 1st Lt Glenn F. Gibson. The two tanks were parked on the road ahead of the M-7. A brigadier general from the 40th Division had given the tank commander a direct order to stay in front of the M-7 and to move on Fentle's command. Gibson had a 20 power telescope mounted on a small tripod. I had my binoculars. We lay on the road beside the M-7 scanning the slope of the ridge we were preparing to attack. When we found a black spot in the grass the gun would fire direct fire at this spot. A large hole would be blown out revealing the remains of a bunker. The M-7 destroyed ten or twelve bunkers in a couple of hours. This would have been a very difficult position to take had we attacked it with the bunkers intact. It might have been more difficult than the line we attacked the 21st.  Now we were using our supporting weapons as we should. We had to learn, though.

We had never operated in open country with armor before. Armor could have been put to great use on Corregidor saving lives. Imagine the effect one tank or M-7 would have had the morning of 23 February operating with "E" Company on South Shore Road in the attack on Battery Monja.  While Gibson and I were studying the slopes of the ridge he called my attention to the bottom of a draw near the trail which our engineers were converting into Tokaido Road. There was a doorway leading into a small cave or dugout. A Jap field grade officer was standing in the doorway looking our way through binoculars. The reason we knew he was a field grade officer was because he wore leather leggins, a leather belt, and leather shoulder straps. I was closely watching him when he disappeared into a cloud of smoke, dust, and flying timber due to a direct hit from the 105mm gun. Later, after we advanced, some of the men found a leg encased in a leather leggin.

During the search and fire procedure Gibson had the tanks move forward two or three times. The tanks were tightly buttoned-up, so he communicated with them by the microphone hanging on the left rear of the tanks. The tanks never fired a round that morning. As soon as we felt that M-7 had destroyed the bunkers, I went over to the company and told Capt Taylor that we were ready. The 4.2's fired a short barrage of HE and then smoke, and we moved out. We were not fired upon. The M-7 had found and destroyed every bunker. This was a classic example of the use of direct supporting fire. Granted the situation was perfect for this support, i.e., the entire slope was in view and in line with the M-7.

È